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Abstract
Migration is an obvious response to political, economic, socio-demographic, and ecological crises. 
In recent decades, several crises have occurred in the Mediterranean region; consequently, migration 
has intensified, the geography of flows has been altered, and the roles of some countries within the 
Mediterranean migration system have rapidly changed.
This paper aims to delineate an overview of migration flows in this region over the last 20 years, 
focusing on the new migration flows related to humanitarian crises. In doing so, the present study also 
examines similarities and differences between past and current migration factors that shape the decisions 
of individuals. Migration flows are closely linked to the needs and fears of European societies. Following 
this logic, and by analysing challenges related to demographic and geopolitical dimensions in the future 
scenario, this study discusses the necessity of new policy responses. 
Keywords: Migrations; Mediterranean region; humanitarian crises; demographic and geopolitical 
dimensions.
Resumen
Las migraciones son una respuesta obvia a las crisis políticas, económicas, sociales y ecológicas. Du-
rante las últimas décadas se han producido varias crisis en la región mediterránea; en consecuencia, las 
migraciones se han intensificado, la geografía de los flujos se ha alterado y los papeles de algunos países 
dentro del sistema migratorio mediterráneo han cambiado rápidamente.
Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión general de los flujos migratorios en esta región durante los 
últimos veinte años, centrándose en los nuevos flujos relacionados con las crisis humanitarias. El presen-
te estudio también examina similitudes y diferencias entre los factores migratorios pasados y actuales que 
influyen sobre las decisiones individuales. Los flujos migratorios están estrechamente vinculados a las 
necesidades y a los desasosiegos de las sociedades europeas. Siguiendo esta lógica, al analizar los desafíos 
relacionados con las dimensiones demográficas y geopolíticas en el escenario futuro, este estudio discute 
la necesidad de una nueva respuesta política.
Palabras clave: Migraciones; región mediterránea; crisis humanitarias; dimensiones demográficas y 
geopolíticas.
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1. Introduction
The Mediterranean region has always been a unique and important geostrategic region for economic 
and human interchanges involving the Near Eastern, North African and European states. It is an extre-
mely heterogeneous area which includes countries that are closely connected by geographic proximity, 
and yet are very diverse historically, culturally and politically.
The varying levels of development, the geographical specificities, and the plurality of settlement con-
figurations across these countries strengthen this diversity. Consequently, the demographic trends also 
vary significantly (Carella & Parant, 2014).
Two different demographic patterns can be observed in this region. The first concerns the countries 
of the northern littoral, which are facing demographic changes characterised by a slight increase of po-
pulation related to international migration gains and a marked decline in fertility accompanied by a rapid 
population aging. The second involves the countries of the southern and eastern littorals, which are still 
undergoing the first demographic transition phase, characterised by a relatively young population with 
relatively high fertility and mortality levels and international migration losses (Parant & Léger, 2020).
Recent studies have documented that over time the entire Mediterranean region has been marked by 
a downturn in fertility rates and a raise in life expectancy which have both narrowed the range between 
the extremes (Carella & Parant, 2016). In particular, some of these studies have shown that the advance-
ment of the transitional demographic process has engendered a gradual convergence of the demographic 
behaviours in the Arab and Near Eastern countries towards those of the European ones (Angeli & Salvini, 
2018).
Another strand of literature suggests that a general notion of hypothetical homogeneity, or of demo-
graphic duality, in the Mediterranean has to be refuted when carefully analysing the indicators related 
to natural and migratory movement of populations. In other words, the variety of demographic regimes 
shaping the real heterogeneities in the Mediterranean region seems to be produced by trends and changes 
related to the political and cultural peculiarities of each country (Dumont, 2018).
Furthermore, the recent history of the Mediterranean region confirms the persistence of considerable 
socio-demographic disparities, due to the wide diversity of patterns in population growth and due to the 
consolidation of socio-economic differentials between the countries.
Over time, in order to compensate for these disparities individuals and families have always reacted 
by moving within the region, or by leaving it. Thus, as a historical crossroads, the Mediterranean has 
become an area of internal circulation involving diverse flows of population.
In this region the migratory patterns replicate those observed in other areas of the world in terms of 
the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors or drivers. The demand for cheap labour in the ageing 
societies of the European Economic Area is met by the countries of the African and Asian littorals (except 
Israel) and the Western Balkans. These countries have relatively young populations, as well as a general 
lack of economic opportunities that create jobs and provide economic stability in general. Obviously, 
people move not only because of economic disparities, but also for personal as well as political reasons.
Castles and Vezzoli (2009), referring to the financial crises unfolding in 2007, stated:
The current crisis is likely to have deep-reaching effects that we cannot foresee. It is mistaken to be-
lieve that migrants will serve as a safety valve for developed economies, by providing labour in times 
of expansion and going away in recession. When economic conditions get bad in rich countries they 
may be even worse in poorer origin countries. Moreover, migrants are social beings, who put down 
roots and form relationships in new countries. At times of recession, the motivation to migrate may 
be even higher than before, and remittances may prove a resilient form of international transfer. Fi-
nally, global economic inequality and the demographic imbalances between the ageing populations of 
the North and the large cohorts of working age persons in the South will remain important factors in 
generating future migration (p. 74).
During recent decades, several crises have occurred in the Mediterranean; consequently, migration 
has intensified, and the geography of flows has been altered. New migration routes have been added to 
the previous ones and new reasons—including economic ones—have led individuals and households 
to migrate. In this context, being that migration is extremely sensitive to shifts in the surrounding 
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environment, the spatial distribution and the roles of some countries within the Mediterranean migration 
system have rapidly changed.
The principal aim of this study is to investigate the trends and the nature of migration flows affecting 
the Mediterranean region between 2000 and 2020, a period marked by profound social, economic and 
political crises. We intend to examine the different effects of the various recent crises on the migration 
patterns and on the Mediterranean migration system in general. Aspects of emigration and immigration, 
but to a certain extent also the flows of transit migration along the various Mediterranean routes, are the 
subject of the analysis presented.
By focusing on contemporary migration patterns concerning the Mediterranean region, this paper 
complements and updates the literature on this topic showing the similarities and differences between 
past and current migration drivers. It investigates overall migration flows with a special focus on asylum 
seekers and refugees.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section provides some background and a short review of the 
literature on the determinants that have shaped the migratory system in the Mediterranean. A description 
of the data and methods is then presented. Next, a general analysis of the migration flows over the last 
twenty years is provided, with a focus on two specific issues: the new migration flows linked to humani-
tarian crises, and the loss of human lives due to the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea. The results of our 
analyses are discussed and put into future perspective in the final section.
1.1. Conceptualising contemporary migration in the Mediterranean
In Mediterranean context, the term ‘Southern European model of immigration’ was coined in the 
1990s (King & Rybaczuk, 1993; King & Thomso, 2008) when southern Europe has mainly become an 
area of immigration rather than emigration. Since the 1990s most southern European countries have 
experienced consistent unregulated immigration flows involving immigrants from a wide range of Eu-
ropean, Latin American, Asian and African countries (including Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt in the sou-
thern Mediterranean region). King & Rybaczuk (1993) identified diverse factors to explain the rise in 
immigration in the northern Mediterranean countries, including ease of entry, geographic and/or cultural 
nearness, economic growth causing greater disparities in income and unemployment levels, and the de-
mographic disparities between an ageing population as compared to growing younger populations in the 
countries of origin. The migration flows into the northern Mediterranean countries seem to be closely 
linked to globalisation and the considerable segmentation of their labour markets, with specific sectors 
(for example, agriculture and the home care sector) relying on the cheap, informal labour provided by im-
migrants. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that emigration from Southern Europe never stopped, 
and it gained renewed importance after the great economic recession of 2007-2013.
The Mediterranean region is always experiencing persistent and substantial flows of population, and 
variations in these flows have often caused changes in net migration. Nevertheless, since in many Medi-
terranean countries migration statistics are not available or accurate our knowledge on migration flows 
is limited and the migratory phenomenon is often measured as the difference between natural and total 
population change. As a result it is often impossible to assess the levels of in- and out-migration that lead 
to this estimated migratory balance (Lafleur & Stanek, 2017).
To provide a complete picture of migratory movements in the Mediterranean region, it is necessary 
to combine the migration patterns at different geographic levels (from the local, to the regional, to the 
national) as well as their determinants and features which have always been very diverse.
Inter-Mediterranean flows have often been identified as a dual migratory system of opposing coun-
tries: the suppliers of migrants from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (except Israel), and the 
receiving nations of the Mediterranean European Union bordering the Northern Littoral. In this context 
the Western Balkans (especially Yugoslavia and its successor states) have been identified as a sub-region 
of emigration. It seems that until the 1980s most migration flows could be characterised as labour mi-
gration or economically active individuals moving to the north for economic reasons. Since then, the 
nature of migratory movements has changed: Socio-cultural and political as well as economic reasons 
have favoured further forms of migration, producing new flows alongside the axis of north-north and 
south-south (King, 2001).
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On this last route, the Mediterranean is part of an inter-African regional mobility system that inter-
plays with Euro-Mediterranean or inter-Arab migrations. Indeed, due to even more severe controls at the 
European frontiers, and to the Mobility Partnerships signed with the European Union4, Maghreb coun-
tries (especially Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya) have become transit countries through which increasing 
numbers of Sub-Saharan migrants (regular or irregular) move to enter Europe (Wihtol de Wenden, 2013).
To sum up, the effects of the European integration process, the new logics of spatial mobility related 
to globalization and the specific migratory patterns in the southeast of the Mediterranean lead us to ques-
tion the concept of convergence towards a Mediterranean migratory duality based on simplistic push-pull 
models.
Additionally, during the two last decades financial, socio-economic and political crises have triggered 
important transformations which have also changed the roles of some countries within the contemporary 
Mediterranean migration system (Bellis, Carella, Léger, & Parant, 2021).
First, during the economic recession, young people and adults from the southern European countries 
most affected by the crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) reacted to adverse socio-economic condi-
tions by moving to Northern Europe (Staniscia & Benassi, 2018). This renewed southern European flux 
of emigration to northern European countries remained attractive despite the crisis, having reconfigured 
the spatial distribution in some countries where the net migration rate has become negative.
Second, the Arab Spring which started with some protests and uprisings at the end of 2010 has 
seemingly not led to the formation of additional migration flows, apart from a minor flow from Tunisia, 
but it has generated two major refugee crises, first in Libya and then in Syria (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012).
During recent socio-economic and political crises in the Mediterranean region the characteristics of 
immigrants have changed. The number of undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers (per-
sons in need of humanitarian protection), as well as transit migrants, has increased substantially in the 
past decade enhancing the complexity of the Mediterranean migratory system.
However, migration flows themselves also represent a crisis. The deaths of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea are unacceptable for European societies. The operations of the European border pro-
tection agency (FRONTEX) seem to not always consider saving lives to be the highest priority. Indeed, 
European societies are in the midst of a conflict between humanitarian values and populist desires to keep 
migrants out of Europe. Collyer & King (2016) argue:
On 19 April 2015 around 800 people were drowned in the Mediterranean Sea south of Lampedu-
sa – the small Sicilian island – when the hopelessly overcrowded and unseaworthy boat in which 
they were trying to reach Europe capsized. This tragic accident, the most significant loss of life in a 
single such incident ever recorded, marks the beginning of a narrative of crisis associated with the 
movement of people to Europe. Unfortunately, none of this is new. Over the last few decades, undocu-
mented migration, meaning travel organized specifically to avoid the institutionalized system of state 
regulation, has become increasingly common across the Mediterranean. These dangerous journeys 
have often resulted in tragedy (p.2).
Hence, the Mediterranean today is a region open to multiple contrasts that reflect the intensity and 
diversity of migratory movements within a context of crises. Socio-economic uncertainty, persistent eco-
nomic difficulties, and political unrest in the Mediterranean countries of Africa, Asia and neighbouring 
countries have contributed to an increase in migration flows over the past two decades. Faced with these 
unprecedented migration flows, European countries, as well as the southern countries of this region, 
have become sending, transit, or receiving areas, and sometimes all three simultaneously (Schmoll, Thio-
llet, & Wihtol de Wenden, 2015).
Additionally, the financial crisis of 2008 has further promoted South-North-South circular migration 
for, such as between Spain and Algeria (Cabezón-Fernández & Sempere-Souvannavong, 2019), or return 
migration from France, Italy and Spain to Morocco and from Portugal to Guinea. In particular, outflows 
4 The EU has been in negotiations on readmission agreements (EURAs) with Morocco and Tunisia since the beginning of the 2000s, 
but until now the agreements are still not in sight. However, both Morocco and Tunisia have signed so-called Mobility Partnerships 
(MP) with the EU in June 2013 and in March 2014, respectively. These MPs provide a general framework for cooperating on border 
management and on the expulsion of undocumented Moroccan and Tunisian migrants (Abderrahim, 2019). The agreements mandate 
that the two governments in Rabat and Tunis ‘readmit’ Moroccan and Tunisian nationals residing irregularly in the EU.
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of Moroccans from Spain have increased since 2008, reaching 40,000 individuals in 2013 (UNDESA, 
2020). Moreover, in recent decades there has been an increase in flows of older migrants returning home 
at retirement age or adopting a transnational migration strategy anchored in different locations, often 
maintaining a residence in both their destination and their origin countries (De Haas, & Fokkema, 2010).
Interestingly, the need to map out a specific migration research agenda for the Mediterranean region 
was just recently expressed (Zapata-Barrero, 2020), generating an interesting special issue of the journal 
Comparative Migration Studies.
Finally, the themes of bordering and globalization were linked to international migration in the Me-
diterranean context also by Ribas-Mateos (2017, 2005) in a comprehensive study focusing on several 
‘gateway cities’ of the European Mediterranean shore and on their forms of welfare and migration. Mo-
reover in a recent contribution the concept of borders engaged in the relationship between wealth and 
poverty has been studied ethnographically comparing the situation in the Mediterranean region with the 
US-Mexico border one (Heyman and Ribas-Mateos, 2019) and extending the analysis beyond migration.
2. Methodology
The Mediterranean region is defined here5 as all 21 countries bordering the Mediterranean, plus four 
- Portugal, Serbia (with Kosovo), the Republic of North Macedonia and Jordan - that are located nearby.
The choice to include in the region the latter countries that do not have a natural access to the Medite-
rranean Sea depends on two reasons. First, they are closely associated with the remaining Mediterranean 
states sharing history and geographical characteristics (Carella & Parant, 2016). Therefore, by joining 
them the Mediterranean region bring together European peninsulas (Iberian, Italian, Balkan) which ad-
vance towards the South of the Mediterranean and Anatolian highland that expands into the sea on an 
east-west axis between the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Second, the Mediterranean migratory system is characterized by a complexity which cannot be igno-
red: migrations in this region are not just unfolding in different directions but also interact with geopoli-
tical factors affecting also the neighbourhood. Consequently, all countries of this region, including those 
without direct access to the Mediterranean Sea, should be considered when analysing current internatio-
nal migration flows in the Mediterranean region.
In the Mediterranean region, as identified in this paper, in 2020 about 550 million people lived across 
three continents: Africa, Asia, and Europe. Approximately 333 million people are concentrated in the 
countries of the south-eastern shores and more than half of the Mediterranean population (56%) resides 
in four countries: Egypt, France, Italy and Turkey (Table 1).
However, the population is not evenly distributed across the region; in some Mediterranean countries 
people live much more concentrated than in others. Malta, Palestine (especially the Gaza Strip), and 
Lebanon are the smallest and the most densely populated countries in the area, while Algeria and Libya 
have the lowest population densities.
Mediterranean countries are also characterized by many inequalities that can be assessed using 
demographic, social and economic indicators. The disparities between the north and south of the 
region become evident by analysing the degree of socio-economic development using the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which takes into account three basic dimensions: longevity, education and 
per capita income. According to the latest report (United Nations Development Programme, 2020), all 
the European Union Mediterranean countries, Montenegro in the Western Balkans, and Israel on the 
Asian littoral have achieved a very high level of human development. The rest of the countries fall in 
the ‘High human development’ group, except Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic, which are in the 
medium and low HDI groups, respectively. The three countries with the highest HDI ranking in the 
Mediterranean region are Israel (0.919), Slovenia (0.917) and Spain (0.904), while Syria and Morocco 
5 This paper includes 25 countries divided into sub-regions as follows:
• European Littoral
 - European Union countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Malta, Cyprus;
 - Western Balkans: Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Republic of North Macedonia;
• Asian Littoral: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan;
• African Littoral: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco
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(0.567 and 0.686, respectively), have the lowest HDI values and rank at 151st and 121st position out of a 
total of 189 countries in 2019 (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).
Gaps in human development can depend on many factors related to unequal opportunities in access 
to education, healthcare and employment, or to persistent income inequalities. In the Mediterranean, the 
weakest value of the indicators that compose the HDI of Morocco concern the mean number of years of 
schooling for people aged 25 and older: in 2019 it was 5.6 years (estimated), lower than the one observed 
in Arab countries on average (7 years).
















Portugal 10,197 111.3 33,967 0.864 38
Spain 46,755 93.7 40,975 0.904 25
France 65,274 119.2 47,173 0.901 26
Italy 60,462 205.6 42,776 0.892 29
Slovenia 2,079 103.2 38,080 0.917 22
Croatia 4,105 73.4 28,070 0.851 43
Greece 10,423 80.9 30,155 0.888 32
Malta 442 1379.8 39,555 0.895 28
Cyprus 1,207 130.7 38,207 0.887 33
West Balkans 17,607
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,281 64.3 14,872 0.780 73
Montenegro 628 46.7 21,399 0.829 48
Albania 2,878 105.0 13,998 0.795 69
Serbia 8,737 99.9 17,192 0.806 64
North Macedonia 2,083 82.6 15,865 0.774 82
Asian Littoral 132,625
Turkey 84,339 109.6 27,701 0.820 54
Syria 17,501 95.3 3,613 0.567 151
Lebanon 6,825 667.2 14,655 0.744 92
Israel 8,656 400.0 40,187 0.919 19
Palestine 5,101 847.4 6,417 0.708 115
Jordan 10,203 114.9 9,858 0.729 102
African Littoral 201,786
Egypt 102,334 102.8 11,466 0.707 116
Libya 6,871 3.9 15,688 0.724 105
Tunisia 11,819 76,.1 10,414 0.740 95
Algeria 43,851 18.4 11,174 0.748 91
Morocco 36,911 82.7 7,368 0.686 121
Mediterranean Region 552,962
Sources: World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision; Human Development Report, 2020
The very low HDI ranking of the Syrian Arab Republic reflects the serious socio-political conflicts that 
this country has suffered since 2011. The civil war, or proxy war, that began in 2011 has caused the HDI 
values to fall and the country is now at the bottom of the medium human development group (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2020). In fact, the Syrian Arab Republic’s HDI ranking fell in only 
5 years from the 116th position in 2012 to the 155th in 2017.
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Regarding the economic dimension of the HDI, the main disparities in the Mediterranean region con-
sist in the significant inequality observed in terms of gross national income (GNI) per capita between the 
European littoral and the southern and eastern countries of the Mediterranean. Although the economic 
living standards of these countries are very heterogeneous, their income values are markedly lower than 
those of the northern ones.
In this context Israel is the only exception; indeed, the indicators that compose its HDI converge and 
even surpass those of the countries of the northern Mediterranean. The population of Israel has a life 
expectancy at birth among the highest in the world (83.0 years for both sexes combined in 2019, 84.5 for 
women and 81.3 for men) and a high level of education (an average of 13 years of schooling in 2019), as 
well as a high income per capita (40,187 in PPP$ in 2019).
The population size and the level of human development is not only very heterogeneous in the Medi-
terranean countries but also among the neighbouring countries (Figure 1).
Figure 1. The geographical area of analysis. Population size and HDI values of countries of the Mediterranean region 
and neighbouring countries
Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects: The 
2019 Revision and United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2020
To conduct our analysis we use data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, various years) that allow us 
to investigate the population dynamics and net migration trends concerning Mediterranean countries 
from 2000 to 2020. Moreover, to analyse the phenomena of refugees and asylum seekers we explore data 
provided by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020). These same data are 
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used to examine irregular migrations and interceptions and deaths along the western, central and eastern 
Mediterranean routes for the more recent period.
An additional source of information is the Frontex data (Frontex, 2021) that refer to the detections 
of illegal border-crossing by the EU border protection agency. These attempts vary considerably over the 
years and were obviously the highest in 2015 and 2016. These data reflect certainly the existing migra-
tory pressure at the EU borders, however, the attempted EU border crossings refer to events rather than 
persons.
In addition to this officially reported statistical information from various international organisations, 
detailed country-to-country migration flows estimates for the period of 1990 to 2015 (Abel & Cohen, 
2019) are used to sketch the migration patterns affecting the Mediterranean and to outline the impor-
tance of the Mediterranean crossroads for international migration flows to Europe from Africa and Asia. 
Abel & Cohen (2019) provide estimates of bilateral migration flows between all countries for the 5-year 
periods between 1990 and 2015 based on data on stocks and flows of international migration published 
by the UN Population Division following different methods. The methods include those based on chan-
ges in migrant stocks, a method based on migration flow rates, and methods based on global demographic 
accounting using bilateral stocks of migrants, as well as births and deaths. The analysis in the following 
section will focus on a method developed by Abel (2018). The different estimation methods and the 
ensuing different results underline the approximate nature of the information regarding the quantitative 
scope of the international migration flows, not to mention the qualitative characteristics. These aspects 
should be kept in mind in the following analysis.
3. Results: Recent migration dynamics in the Mediterranean region
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the classic approach of reducing Mediterranean migratory exchan-
ges to the South-North dimension has lost its value because most of the countries in this region experien-
ce simultaneously the three different processes of emigration, transit migration and immigration. Increa-
sing social and economic disparities, as well as socio-political factors, have, over time, altered migration 
routes between origins and destinations in the Mediterranean, redefining the traditional trajectories of 
migration flows.
To discuss this assumption in greater detail, we examine in this section the migration dynamics in 
the region over the last two decades. Our analysis starts with the idea that the Mediterranean cannot be 
considered a homogeneous and closed space, and that migration flows can be heterogeneous regarding 
motives. Thus we attempt to delineate different migratory profiles, paying particular attention to the 
flows and stocks of refugees and asylum seekers. Moreover, we address the implications of recent irregu-
lar migration flows by analysing the interceptions and deaths recorded in this region.
3.1. Population trends and net migration
The demography of the Mediterranean region has always been characterized by a marked heteroge-
neity, which creates a sort of dual space: a northern shore characterized by developed economies and 
post-transitional populations (individualistic, with low fertility and mortality rates, delayed family for-
mation, small families, and ageing populations) and a southern shore including less developed economies 
and still-growing younger populations (Livi Bacci & Veronesi, 1990; Di Comite & Moretti, 1999). The 
northern shore, as always, plays a role in attracting migration flows, while the southern is an area of ori-
gin. However, today these simple demographic and socio-economic juxtapositions are no longer the only 
determinants of migration flows and, as a result of several changes in the geopolitical scenario and the 
globalization process, the picture appears more nuanced than in the past.
The population of the European littoral decreased rather significantly in the period considered here 
even though, in the case of the Balkan countries, we see a weak recovery in the last five years. The Asian 
littoral recorded increasing values for the average annual rate of population change up to 2005-2010, 
after which, although still positive, they continued to decrease. In contrast, the African shore shows 
a constant population growth throughout the period analysed here (Figure 2a.). Taking into account 
the net migration rates, the differences within the European littoral are marked. The European littoral 
on the EU side also differs from the other two macro-geographical areas, being the only region that 
registers positive values for average net migration, even if those values have decreased over time. For this 
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indicator, the Asian littoral shows a trend similar to that which was commented on previously, though the 
contraction is more marked here, so much so as to assume negative values in the last 5-year period. In the 
detail of groups of countries, the geographical element emerges quite clearly by configuring the changing 
spatial patterns of the net migration rate (Figure 2b.). In the first period (2000-2005) the spatial pattern 
was pretty clear: The more economically developed parts of the Mediterranean region (i.e., the European 
littoral–EU countries) attract international migration flows, thus showing positive values for the net 
migration rate. In comparison, all other countries (i.e., European littoral—Balkan countries and African 
littoral) are characterized by negative net migration rates. In the case of the Asian littoral the atypical net 
migration trends are due to military conflicts in neighbouring countries.
Figure 2. 5-year average annual rate of population change (a.) and 5-year average net migration rate (b.) 
by groups of countries of the Mediterranean region, 2000-2020









2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
European littoral - European Union European littoral - Western Balkans








2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
European littoral - European Union European littoral - Western Balkans
Asian littoral African littoral
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). 
World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1. Own elaboration
The permanent economic disparities, the repercussions of the global financial crisis (2008–2013) or 
Great Recession, the Arab Spring, and the conflict in Syria have all contributed to significantly change 
this dual, and quite classic, scheme in recent years. At the end of the time period analysed (2015-2020) 
the situation is more complex: Portugal and Greece exhibit slight negative net migration rates; Spain, 
France, Slovenia and Serbia are characterized by slight net migration gains between 0 and 1 per thousand; 
and Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan display positive net migration rates due to the arrival of Syrians who 
were forced to leave their country because of the conflict that began 10 years ago.
These migration losses and gains are driven by international migration flows. Table 2 shows the 
imbalances in the flows and their changes after the year 2000. The European littoral seems to have lost 
attractiveness especially after the great recession that brought also out-migration flows to the other Eu-
ropean countries and the rest of the world. Most migration flows to Africa might be return migrants. We 
observe persistent emigration from the West Balkans to the European Littoral and the other European 
countries. The Asian littoral went through considerable changes in the immigration flows especially 
because of the wars in Western Asia and subsequent return migrations or, probably, onward migrations 
toward Europe, excluding the European countries bordering the Mediterranean. The European littoral 
seems to have lost attractiveness to the detriment of other European countries. Unfortunately no esti-
mates are available for the last 5-year period that was marked by the Syrian civil war and the ensuing 
migratory movements.
Most international migration flows enter Europe by sea and air using regular means of travel. Howe-
ver, the public image is dominated by irregular immigration which has far greater visibility.
The main sea and land migration routes of irregular migration flows in the Mediterranean region are 
the western (towards Spain including the Canary Islands), the central (towards Italy and Malta), the wes-
tern (towards Cyprus and Greece) and the Balkan routes. In most cases the first country of arrival is not 
the country of desired final destination. In the case of transit migrants before reaching the Mediterranean 
region the migration trajectory over land was usually long and perilous. Important to remember that 
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migration trajectories are flexible and complex and primarily serve the migrants to achieve their ultimate 
goal of the migration project. So, the sea and land routes mentioned above are subject to change, and 
most migrants, certainly not the poorest, are most likely travelling by air.
Table 2. Estimated migration flows related to the Mediterranean region for the periods 2000-2004, 
2005-2009 and 2010-2014 (in thousands)














Europe - 1,376 5 49 1 2 88 264
European Littoral 359 - 7 36 1 3 34 66
West Balkans 208 204 - 7 0 0 1 66
Asian Littoral 274 172 0 - 113 377 5 172
African Littoral 96 884 0 74 - 74 100 60
Western Asia 366 66 0 305 42 - 85 260
Africa 597 649 0 29 16 9 - 522
Rest of the World 3,716 3,021 6 563 17 2,357 101 -
2005-2009
Europe - 994 18 36 0 11 71 180
European Littoral 752 - 21 60 16 20 157 251
West Balkans 163 212 - 4 0 0 2 65
Asian Littoral 258 51 1 - 5 124 5 90
African Littoral 171 737 0 159 - 299 27 107
Western Asia 401 22 0 1,032 22 - 32 182
Africa 796 608 0 42 75 548 - 709
Rest of the World 4,279 2,239 2 312 15 5,871 160 -
2010-2014
Europe - 332 3 30 1 38 47 367
European Littoral 940 - 24 21 11 11 118 756
West Balkans 194 180 - 0 0 0 1 40
Asian Littoral 761 62 4 - 73 1,220 5 444
African Littoral 178 425 1 288 - 216 33 238
Western Asia 228 18 0 469 15 - 13 312
Africa 906 722 0 30 30 239 - 1,456
Rest of the World 3,649 1,398 6 218 6 4,547 144 -
Source: Abel & Cohen (2019). Own elaboration
It is difficult to characterize migrants according to the predominant motive for their move, as perso-
nal, economic and political motivations are closely related. In the following two sections we would like 
to focus first on refugees and asylum seekers who should enjoy specific protections, and second on the 
phenomenon of irregular migration within the Mediterranean region.
3.2. Refugees and asylum seekers
One of the consequences of humanitarian crises, wars, and political instability is an increase in the 
number of people obliged to flee their homes. They become internally displaced persons when they stay 
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within their countries, or refugees and asylum seekers when they are forced to flee their countries. Several 
major crises causing important displacements in the Mediterranean region have occurred: In the 1990s it 
was the Balkan War, and in the last two decades the Syrian conflict, the conflict in Afghanistan, conflicts 
and climate changes in the Sahel region, and other conflicts and crises in Asian and African (such as in 
Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Central African Republic). Additionally, in recent years refugee crisis in some 
Latin American countries resulting from political instability, threats and persecution has generated an 
exodus of people seeking international protection. In general, the number of refugees and asylum seekers 
from Latin America has increased since 2019 and some European countries have become destinations for 
them, especially Spain, followed by Italy and Portugal (Eurostat, 2020).
In the recent past all crises, due to contingent and geographical issues, have found their maximum 
expression in the Mediterranean region, which connects different worlds. We refer here only to flows 
involving this area (25 by 25 origin destination square matrix). The data in Figure 3 are extremely revea-
ling: From 2000 to 2020 the number of refugees and asylum seekers grew significantly. The most intense 
growth started after the second period (2005-2009), with a strong acceleration in the last few years.
Figure 3. Refugees and asylum seekers in the Mediterranean region by origin and destination (country of asylum), 
2000-2020 (in thousands)
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data. Own elaboration
The beginning of the millennium was characterised by the Yugoslav wars and conflicts linked to the 
breakup of the Yugoslav federation, as well as the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the 1990s that ended 
only in 2001. This third Balkan war led to high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. All these political crises and conflicts also produ-
ced internally displaced persons. Other conflicts are the war in Lebanon (in 2006, after a civil war from 
1975 to 1990), and the civil wars after the revolt in 2011 in Libya and especially Syria. The latter two can 
be linked to the Arab Spring. In addition to the 6.7 million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers living in 
other countries in 2020, there are an estimated 6.7 million internally displaced persons. And the refugees 
and asylum seekers from Palestine are a constant presence over the last decades. Another long-lasting 
conflict is the one between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish government.
The numbers and origins of the refugees and asylum seekers changed during the observation period as 
a result of new geopolitical scenarios. At the beginning of the millennium (2000) more than 80% of refu-
gees and asylum seekers originated from the European littoral, particularly from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo. After 2010 this changed dramatically: Today (2020) 97% of the total refugee 
and asylum seeker population in the Mediterranean region originate from the Asian littoral, and 93% are 
from Syria alone. For the stocks of asylum seekers we observe different patterns. In the first period (2000-
2004) the highest shares recorded were from the European littoral–Western Balkans and the Asian littoral 
(48.7% and 40.6%, respectively). In the subsequent periods the number of asylum seekers from the Asian 
littoral grew significantly, reaching 71.0% in 2015-2019. The opposite is true for those originating from the 
European littoral-Western Balkans (14.0% in 2015-2019). The share of asylum seekers originating from 
the African littoral grew as well, rising from 10.6% in 2000-2004 to 15.0% in the last period (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. 5-year proportion of (a) refugees and (b) asylum seekers compared to the total number of refugees 
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data. Own elaboration
Observing refugees and asylum seekers by country allows us to detect the changing geographies of 
origin and destination. This analysis concentrates on the two most prominent cases: 1) the breakup of 
Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, which involved the present coun-
tries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo and Slove-
nia; and 2) the still ongoing civil war in Syria. The countries of origin of refugees and asylum seekers 
reflect past and present political and military conflicts. In addition to these two crises we focus on several 
conflicts that are creating refugees and asylum seekers. The continuously precarious situation of many 
Palestinians living outside of their home territory is well known and has been a persistent crisis in recent 
decades. At the beginning of the observation period, a high number of nationals of Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, 
Albania and Algeria were living as refugees and asylum seekers in other countries. In the case of Turkey, 
many reached Iraq and several European countries, particularly Germany. And in the case of Syria, many 
reached European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. However, the majority is 
today living in neighbouring countries. In recent years the most prominent countries of origin of refugees 
and asylum seekers (after Syria) are Turkey and Egypt, two countries characterised by internal political 
conflicts. Libya is another, having experienced two civil wars, the first in 2011 and the second since 2014. 
Most of the refugees and asylum seekers from these countries have been hosted by western and northern 
European countries and the USA. And in the case of Turkey, Iraq also plays an important role.
The first of the two crises caused by armed conflicts (Figure 5) focuses on the break-up of multi-eth-
nic Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980) and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Ethnic conflicts, 
outright wars of independence, insurgencies in the individual states that had formed Yugoslavia, and 
ethnic cleansing led to several waves of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as internally displaced per-
sons beginning in the early 1990s and continuing until the early 2000s. Still today UNHCR is assisting 
persons that were forced to leave their homes then. The consequences of the second crisis were observa-
ble immediately after the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The civil war grew out of the Arab Spring 
protests and opposed the government and single forces of factions along political, ethnic and religious 
lines. Foreign forces also intervened.
In Table 3, data are reported regarding refugees and asylum seekers originating from three countries 
involved in the breakup of Yugoslavia and Syria, grouped by the most important countries of destination. 
The year chosen is the one with the highest numbers observed (see Figure 5). In the case of the Balkan 
countries, the neighbouring countries play an important role: Refugees and asylum seekers moved from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia (25%), and from Croatia to Serbia (84%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(11%). But western and northern European countries, as well as the USA and Canada, also played a role. 
In fact, NATO played a political and military role in the conflicts in these countries, and bonds between 
certain areas were already created in the 1960s and 1970s through the migration of ‘Gastarbeiter’ to 
Germany and other European countries. In the case of the refugees and asylum seekers from Syria, the 
neighbouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) are absorbing the brunt of the exodus. To a lesser 
degree, European and other Arabic countries are also offering support.
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Figure 5. Refugees and asylum seekers in the context of two crises: the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s 
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Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data. Own elaboration
Table 3. Destination countries of refugees and asylum seekers in the context of two crises: 
the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the Syrian civil war in the 2010s
Destinations of refugees and asylum seekers from selected countries of origin and years
(in %)
The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation The civil war in Syria
Country Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Serbia and Kosovo Syria
Year 1996 1999 2002 2018
Refugees and asylum 
seekers (in 1,000)
994 354 346 6,794
Germany 33.2 Serbia&Kos. 84.4 Germany 54.6 Turkey 53.3
Serbia&K 25.2 Bosnia&Her. 11.2 Sweden 9.9 Lebanon 13.9
Croatia 16.0 Canada 1.2 UK 5.8 Jordan 10.0
Austria 7.5 Australia 1.0 USA 5.0 Germany 8.6
Sweden 5.0 Sweden 0.8 Switzerland 3.9 Iraq 3.7
USA 3.2 USA 0.6 Netherlands 3.1 Egypt 2.0
Denmark 2.6 Others 0.8 Australia 2.9 Sweden 1.6
Netherlands 2.2 Norway 2.3 Sudan 1.4
Canada 1.7 Canada 2.2 Austria 0.7
Slovenia 0.8 Bosnia&Herz. 1.8 Greece 0.6
Italy 0.8 France 1.6 Netherlands 0.5
Switzerland 0.5 Denmark 1.4 Libya 0.3
North Maced. 0.5 Austria 1.2 Denmark 0.3
Others 0.8 Finland 0.8 France 0.3
North Maced. 0.8 Switzerland 0.3
Italy 0.6 Bulgaria 0.3
Hungary 0.6 Others 2.3
Others 1.4
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees data. Own elaboration
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When focusing on the Mediterranean region as a destination for refugees and asylum seekers, the des-
tination country that stands out today is Turkey, with about 3,575,000 from Syria, but also 174,000 from 
Iraq, 117,000 from Afghanistan, and 28,000 from Iran (all data refer to 2020; UNHCR, 2020). This role is 
internationally recognized, for example, by the controversial agreement with the EU concluded in 2016 
that limited the movement of Syrians in particular to the EU in exchange for a financial contribution to 
cover the expenses of hosting the refugee and asylum seekers. Lebanon (747,000) and Jordan (901,000) 
admit refugees and asylum seekers from Syria and also Iraq. Egypt, with a total of 329,000, admits Syrians 
and Palestinians, but also Sudanese, South-Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians. About 90% of the refugee 
population in Algeria (99,000) are Western Saharans. Also for the EU Mediterranean countries, Syrians 
constitute a significant share of refugees (especially in Greece); however, the refugee and asylum seeker 
populations of these countries do not only belong to the Mediterranean region but come from all over the 
world and often have traditional ties with specific countries or language affinities.
This is a significant change from the beginning of the millennium (2000) when the numbers of refu-
gees and asylum seekers were considerably lower and were influenced by the breakup of Yugoslavia, the 
conflict in Western Sahara, and the situation of the Palestinians. In France, with a total of about 133,000 
asylum seekers and refugees, it was then already possible to observe a multitude of origins for the popula-
tions in need of humanitarian protection, which are, in part, still determined by the conflict in Indochina.
So the Mediterranean region is not only the centre of an exchange of migrants, or a migration hub, 
but it plays a similar role for refugees and asylum seekers from African and Asian countries as well. Migra-
tory flows cross the Mediterranean to reach its northern shore and the economic centres of the European 
Economic Area or the countries that offer a more open policy of humanitarian protection.
3.3. Irregular arrivals, interceptions and deaths in the Mediterranean regions
Due to the restriction of legal methods of reaching the European countries to secure their economic 
livelihoods or humanitarian protection, international migrants are obliged to use alternative means to 
reach the European shore. This includes relying on illegal smugglers and human traffickers that often offer 
risky land passages to the shores of the Mediterranean and subsequent sea passages that are frequently 
highly dangerous. The (often estimated) data provided by the UNHCR in “Data on attempted crossings of 
the Mediterranean Sea 2016-2019” shed some light on a crucial topic that has also become a central issue in 
national and supra-national political debates. The number of irregular arrivals in Mediterranean EU (Spain, 
Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus) exceeded 1 million in 2015, was almost 370,000 in 2016 and 124,000 in 
2019, and reached a relative low of 95,000 in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the continuous 
activities of the coast guards of the countries along the southern European shores and FRONTEX (Table 4).
Table 4. Irregular arrivals (number of people) in Mediterranean Europe*, 2016-2019
Irregular arrivals in Europe* 2016 2017 2018 2019
Total arrivals in Europe 369,977/373,652 180,005/185,139 126,370/141,472 114,951/123,663
Total arrivals by sea in Europe 363,581 173,712 119,570 108,606
Total arrivals by land in Europe 6,396 6,293 6,800 6,345
Spain (Western Mediterranean) 14,558 28,452 64,018 29,809
Sea 8,162 22,159 57,218 23,464
Land 6,396 6,293 6,800 6,345
Italy (Central Mediterranean) 181,436 119,370 23,370 11,471
Sea 181,436 119,370 23,370 11,471
Land  -  -  -  -
Malta (Central Mediterranean) 24 20 1,445 3,405
Sea 24 20 1,445 3,405
Land  -  -  -  -
Greece (Eastern Mediterranean) 173,614 29,501 32,742 62,445
Sea 173,614 29,501 32,742 62,445
Land  -  -  -  -
Cyprus (Eastern Mediterranean) 345 2,662 4,795 7,821
Sea 345 2,662 4,795 7,821
Land  -  -  -  -
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Data on attempted crossings of the Mediterranean Sea 2016-2019”: *Spain 
(Western Med.); Italy and Malta (Central Med.); Greece and Cyprus (Eastern Med.). Own elaboration
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Whereas in 2015 Syrian nationals dominated (48%, followed by Afghans 29%, Iraqis 9%, and Eri-
treans, Nigerians, Pakistanis and Somali), in 2020 the most frequent countries of origin were Tunisia 
(19%) and Algeria (13%), followed by Morocco, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and 
Guinea.
The trend in irregular arrivals is partially explained by the rise in the number of interceptions in the 
Central and Eastern Mediterranean regions, which grew from 52,000 to 71,000 in the period of 2016 
to 2019 (these data refer only to interceptions made by the Libyan, Tunisian and Turkish coast guards) 
(Table 5).
It should be noted that the increase in the number of interceptions is entirely attributable to the Tur-
kish coast guard. If we look at the data on arrival broken down by pathway (sea or land) we can clearly 
see that, in reality, the decrease in the volume of irregular arrivals is due to arrivals by sea decreasing from 
363,581 in 2016 to 114,951 in 2019 (- 68.3%). The fact is that arrival by land is more difficult to detect 
and, in fact, data are only available for Spain, where the volume of the flows remained quite stable during 
the period observed. It is reasonable to suppose that irregular migrants and traffickers are searching for 
loopholes to reach European countries, be it by land or sea. In fact, migration seems to be a process that is 
difficult to stop when individuals are really motivated and determined. What emerges from Table 4 is the 
fact that the real decrease in the number of irregular arrivals occurred in Italy (from 181,436 to 11,471, 
or -93.6%) and in Greece (from 173,614 to 62,445, or -28.1%). In contrast, in Spain, Malta and Cyprus 
irregular arrivals increased significantly from 2016 to 2019.
Table 5. Interceptions in Central and Western Mediterranean, 2016-2019
Interceptions in Central and Western Med. 2016 2017 2018 2019
Interceptions by Libyan Coast Guard 14,332 18,900 15,428 9,225
Interceptions by Tunisian Coast Guard 1,105 3,178 4,091 1,028
Interceptions by Turkish Coast Guard 37,130 19,084 25,398 60,543
Total interceptions 52,567 41,162 44,917 70,796
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Data on attempted crossings of the Mediterranean Sea 2016-2019”. 
Own elaboration
Concerning the number of deaths and disappearances recorded in the Mediterranean region a decrea-
se from extremely high values can be observed in the Eastern and, especially, in the Central Mediterra-
nean (Table 6). But keeping in mind that the Central Mediterranean is composed of Italy and Malta and 
the Eastern Mediterranean of Greece and Cyprus, we can argue that this decrease is essentially the effect 
of the reduction of irregular arrivals in Italy and Greece. This argument is partially confirmed by the data 
regarding deaths and disappearances in the Western Mediterranean (i.e. Spain, including attempts to 
reach the Canary Islands) that increased from 128 in 2016 to 552 in 2019. Spain was one of the countries 
in which the number of irregular arrivals grew between 2016 and 2019. Even if the number of deaths and 
disappearances has recently decreased the loss of human life in the Mediterranean cannot be accepted 
and European countries have to do everything possible to improve the situation.
Table 6. Deaths and disappearances recorded in Mediterranean regions by area, 2015-2020
Deaths /disappearances 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Deaths recorded in Western Mediterranean 102 128 224 811 552 330
Deaths recorded in Central Mediterranean 3,149 4,581 2,853 1,314 1,262 983
Deaths recorded in Eastern Mediterranean 803 434 62 174 71 104
Total deaths and missing 4,054 5,143 3,139 2,299 1,885 1,417
Source: Data from https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean. Own elaboration
It seems useful to draw attention to the seasonality of the flows and their relative magnitudes for 
each Mediterranean area. The total number of attempts is decreasing over time and is characterized by a 
high seasonality; in the summer and spring periods the number of attempts increases, most likely due to 
better weather conditions. In the first period (from the beginning of 2016 to mid-2017), the Central Me-
diterranean (Italy and Malta) show a comparatively high number of attempts. The Eastern Mediterranean 
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(Greece and Cyprus) recorded very high numbers of attempts in the first three months of 2016, and the-
reafter, the numbers decreased significantly. In the last part of 2019, the number of attempts in that area 
rose again. Western Mediterranean (Spain) presents a quite stable profile, with an intensification during 
the second part of 2018 and the first part of 2019. In relative terms, the central Mediterranean corridor 
appears to have the highest rates of death and disappearance. No wonder, then, that migration rescue 
efforts by NGOs are concentrated in this area. In Italy in particular, political positions on protecting the 
lives of migrants on the one hand and limiting the number of arrivals on the other hand clash most se-
verely. The Mediterranean countries of Europe, and the European Community as a whole, must face this 
conflict and find a solution that will protect the lives of those coming in search of a better and safer life.
4. Discussion: What’s next? Some scenarios
During recent decades, several crises have occurred in the Mediterranean region, producing a sharp 
increase in the numbers of internal displacements and international migration. These crises are causing 
terrible suffering to the human beings directly involved. And they lead to social and economic difficulties 
in all the countries affected by the crisis. Today, in the Mediterranean area, a fairly good knowledge of the 
determinants and implications related to contemporary spatial mobility is available (de Haas, Castles & 
Miller, 2020). To formulate hypothetical future scenarios, mechanical and causal arguments such as the 
push-pull model alone are neither adequate nor sufficient. In fact, the variables influencing the decision 
to migrate are multiple and are rather difficult to model. A first step to formulate possible future scenarios 
is to focus on the obvious drivers that underlie the migration flows described above at the macro level, 
hypothesizing that they will continue to maintain validity in the future. In doing so, it must be emphasi-
zed again that the Mediterranean region is not a closed, self-contained space: its particular geographical 
location touching three continents means that migrants, even from very distant countries, transit through 
the region, often as the last stage of a long and winding migratory path. It is therefore natural that the 
following evaluations refer to data and indicators mainly connected to three continents: Africa, Asia and 
Europe. The main drivers that we have identified are substantially related to demography, environment, 
economic growth and the political dimension.
Differential population growth leads to significant imbalances in the overall amount and age structu-
re of the population. These aspects are in themselves elements that favour geographical mobility of the 
population. This mechanism cannot be addressed in a deterministic way, as was often done in the past 
by demographers and economists, because today’s reality is very complex and rapidly changing (Hugo, 
2011). However, considering potential future demographic scenarios can help us to focus on some domi-
nant dynamics. According to the demographic projections of the United Nations (United Nations, 2019), 
significant demographic growth in most African countries will continue into the near future, while we 
will see a decreasing and ageing population in European countries and a substantial stationarity of the 
Asian one, leading to changes in the population weights of the countries and increasing disparities in the 
population age structures in the countries involved. In particular, in the next 30 years the population of 
Africa will see a rise of almost 86%, the Asian population will increase by about 14%, and the European 
continent’s population will decrease by 5%. As already stated, these differences in numbers are correlated 
to other structural differences: the percentage of young people (0-14 years) will decrease on all three 
continents, even though the starting levels are significantly different (if we consider that in 2020 young 
people represented 40% of the African population and only 16% of the European one). The most sig-
nificant contraction will be, in relative terms, that in the African countries (-8.3%). On the other hand, 
future changes in the percentage of the population of working age (i.e., the population potentially eco-
nomically active, 15 to 64 years old) differ between continents. In this case, the only increase is the one 
expected in Africa (+6.1%) while there are significant decreases in this population group for Asia and for 
Europe with an outstanding value of -7.6%. Finally, on all three continents, though with varying degrees 
of intensity, the percentage of elderly (65 years and over) will increase, although, as with young people, 
they start from significantly different initial situations, with Europe in the lead (19.1%) (United Nations, 
2019). These changes in age structure are accompanied by equally significant changes in the geographical 
distribution of the population, summarized here by the percentage change in the urban population. This 
is an important element in understanding international migration phenomena (IOM, 2015). Very often, 
in fact, international migration is nothing more than the final stage of a wider migration process along 
the rural-urban axis (Pumain, 2006). On the other hand, urbanization has a very high environmental 
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cost which, in turn, affects international migration processes, acting as a push factor (Meyerson, Merino 
& Durand, 2007). The gradient between the different continents is impressive: the percentage increase, 
again according to the United Nations (2018), of the urban population in the African continent in the 
next 30 years will be 153%, while it will be 47% in Asia and just 8% in Europe. It therefore seems legi-
timate to state that, at least from a theoretical point of view, the demographic disparities underlying or 
furthering international migration do not seem likely to diminish in the near future.
Another important dimension is related to the environmental aspects. These, including climatic as-
pects, play a fundamental role in determining migratory pressures, especially for countries where the 
agricultural sector represents a significant share of employment and/or a source of self-sufficiency (Ada-
mo & Izazola, 2010; Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, Geddes, & Thomas, 2011). From this perspective, 
the main drivers related to climate change and its environmental effects are numerous. These and other 
relevant aspects are well highlighted in the recent contribution of Livi Bacci (2018), emphasizing that, in 
addition to the explosion of the already mentioned urbanization processes, two particular aspects must 
be taken into account with regard to the complex relationship between man and the environment: human 
intrusion into large forest areas and the growth of populations in the most precarious habitats. In this re-
gard, the author reports very striking data that highlight how deforestation in Africa, Asia and Latin Ame-
rica has assumed alarming levels, as has spreading human settlement, especially in coastal areas, which 
are perceived as being more attractive but are also much more environmentally fragile. In short, it is a 
process of consuming landscape, indeed of what little is left, which does not bode well in relation to the 
pressures leading to future migration flows. A sort of mechanism of attraction and repulsion, the inertial 
force of which, admitted to defuse the causes, seems to be able to continue to produce harmful effects. In 
addition to these aspects which are general in nature, there are others of a more local nature. Particularly 
in some areas of Africa, the process of desertification is an increasing phenomenon. Fuelled by global 
warming, which is a direct effect of human activities, (especially of the More Developed Countries), de-
sertification is taking land and life away from local populations. Consequently, by 2030, some authors 
expect that there will be 135 million climate refugees due to desertification of land on a global scale. Of 
these, 60 million are destined to move from Sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe (Confortin, 
2017). This confirms, as we previously discussed, that climate change is an important contributing factor 
for internal and international migration. A recent report released by the Italian Agency for Development 
Cooperation states that, according to the United Nations (FAO-IFAD-OIMWHP 2018), in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, during the period 1960-2000 changes in temperature and rainfall can be linked to a 50% increase 
in net migration. Some 5 million people have been pushed to migrate from rural areas to urban areas 
due to agricultural production losses and falling incomes and wages (Dessì, 2019). A sort of self-feeding 
or self-reinforcing process is thus outlined: the consumption levels of big cities and their CO
2
 emissions 
promote climate change, such as global warming, which speeds up the desertification processes which, 
in turn, pushes more and more people to urbanize (Livi Bacci, 2018). It is a sort of Malthusian environ-
mental trap that seems to still gain vigour.
The manifest and persistent economic disparities existing in the Mediterranean region and beyond 
are a further element in driving international migration towards the north of the northern Mediterranean 
shore, and towards Europe in general. This is especially true when considering economic prosperity, or 
the lack of it, as an indicator of the possibility of securing the livelihoods of individuals, families and the 
entire population. However, the decision to migrate depends not only on economic opportunities, or the 
lack of them, but also on the availability of resources, be it in the form of economic capital or in the form 
of family and social networks. In the context of the discussion on the Human Development Index above, 
the importance of the economic dimension was already stressed and the existing disparities in the Medi-
terranean region (Table 1) were shown. The gradient of economic wellbeing or development becomes yet 
steeper when considering other African and Asian countries (Figure 1).
The general absence of economic opportunities might be one of the important drivers of emigration. 
But also specific aspects could lead to the decision to emigrate: the phenomenon of land grabbing. This 
is now recognized as a cause of mobility of people, especially in continents such as Africa that are rich 
in land but are otherwise very poor (Pugliese, 2019). In general, external influences can play crucial 
role on mobility of populations. A recent contribution in “La Voce” by Pasquale, Stucchini & Tronchin 
(2019) states that since the early 2000s, the main player in Africa has become China, with a very con-
crete approach: natural resources in exchange for infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, stadiums, 
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railways and ports. On the other hand, as demonstrated in some recent contributions (Clemens & Postel, 
2017), in the short and medium term, economic development of developing countries, typically areas of 
origin for large migratory flows, would not favour a contraction of the migratory push but, on the con-
trary, its expansion (Mendola, 2018).
Besides these macro aspects, individual decision making is an important element in understanding 
migration flows. The disparities in demographic, environmental and economic situations and trends by 
themselves do not lead to migration. Aspirations and capabilities play a decisive role. De Haas (2021) dis-
cusses this concept, which was formulated by Carling earlier (2002) and was further developed by others, 
putting it in relation to other theoretical approaches and pointing out the limitations of functionalist and 
historical-structural theories. De Haas (2021) discusses various categories of migrations that highlight 
the multi-faceted aspects of international migration, referring to the concepts of aspirations to migrate or 
to stay, as well as to the liberty to either migrate or stay. De Haas (2021) also underlines the role played 
by migratory agency and its tendency for self-enforcing:
The entire set of structural conditions at home and in imagined migration destinations creates com-
plex opportunity structures, endowing different individuals and social groups with various sets of 
negative and positive liberties, which, depending on how these structural conditions affect people’s 
capabilities and aspirations and how people perceive these conditions through their social, cultural 
and personal lenses, may, or may not, make them decide to migrate (De Haas, 2021, p. 27).
Existing migration networks show the tendency to reinforce this process. Moreover the aspirations–
capabilities framework can account for increasing propensities to migrate linked to social and economic 
change (de Hass, 2011). With this framework the individual and the family is put at the centre of the 
decision to stay or to migrate. Thus, more information and more liberty might increase the number of 
migrants.
The discussion surrounding the various potential future drivers of international migratory flows 
affecting the Mediterranean region suggests that migration flows will likely continue be directed to the 
European shores or to transit to the other European countries. The demographic component regarding 
potential migrants alone hints at a future increase of migration flows. The COVID-19 pandemic seems to 
have underlined the importance of foreign labour, especially in essential sectors of the European labour 
markets, such as agriculture or personal care. And as long as European countries will retain relatively 
high social and economic living standards, they will remain attractive for migration flows from the Asian 
and African shores of the Mediterranean and beyond.
5. Conclusions
The scenarios delineated here lead us to revisit Mediterranean migration flows in terms of concepts 
and aspects of categorization, and they also invite us to rethink policies that could be adapted to the 
multiple changes and challenges in the region. In other words, two interconnected dimensions become 
crucial in the analysis of the Mediterranean migratory system: the geopolitical component and the need 
to reflect on more interventionist policies. Concerning the first dimension, the issue of spatial mobility 
provides the opportunity to reveal the complex interrelationships among populations, places, and poli-
tics; in turn the analysis cannot ignore the geopolitical circumstances under which this mobility occurs. 
With regard to the second dimension, the inadequacy of the policies adopted in recent decades to gra-
dually manage demographic and socio-economic processes in the origin countries of the migration flows 
interesting the European Mediterranean countries and other European countries invites discussions re-
garding measures and political actions to improve the future situation. The failure of the Barcelona Pro-
cess and the Union for the Mediterranean, the impasse in the Lisbon strategy, and the ineffectiveness of 
decentralized cooperation in the context of co-development impose strategies to facilitate socio-econo-
mic development in less developed countries. In other words, the political management of international 
migration flows should go beyond the bilateral or multilateral agreements to govern these flows. Even if 
the issue is controversial, there seems to be no alternative to a proactive government or management of 
international migration flows in the interest of origin and destination countries. This could be realized 
within the framework of The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and The Global 
Compact on Refugees. Obviously these policies have to go along with measures to support social and 
economic development in countries with a low Human Development Index. The policies can only be 
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virtuous and effective if democratic principles and human rights are respected. In addition to the measu-
res that should apply in ordinary times of permanent crises with regard to demographic, environmental 
and socio-economic differences, we would like to point out the need to react quickly in times of actual 
humanitarian, political or socio-economic crises.
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Appendix
Table A1. Net Migration Rates (per 1,000 population) – Countries of the Mediterranean region
Net migration rate (per 1,000 of population)
2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Portugal 3.4 1.7 -2.7 -0.6
Spain 13.7 10.0 -2.2 0.9
France 3.1 1.4 1.3 0.6
Italy 5.8 3.6 5.5 2.5
Slovenia 1.5 3.9 1.6 1.0
Croatia -0.1 -0.5 -1.8 -1.9
Greece 2.0 -6.7 -3.0 -1.5
Malta 2.8 2.8 7.3 2.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.3 -3.2 -14.5 -6.4
Montenegro -2.6 -0.2 -1.0 -0.8
Serbia -5.9 -2.6 0.7 0.5
Albania -11.4 -14.4 -9.4 -4.9
North Macedonia -1.4 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5
Turkey -0.1 -0.1 4.7 3.5
Syrian Arab Rep. -4.4 3.7 -54.7 -24.1
Lebanon 25.8 -1.1 41.5 -4.5
Israel 3.3 7.9 0.5 1.2
State of Palestine -11.2 -5.4 -7.3 -2.2
Jordan -3.5 20.0 25.6 1.1
Cyprus 11.7 11.0 4.0 4.2
Egypt -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4
Libya -0.7 -4.0 -9.5 -0.3
Tunisia -2.9 -0.8 -2.8 -0.3
Algeria -1.3 -2.1 -0.8 -0.2
Morocco -4.4 -3.6 -2.2 -1.4
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). 
World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision
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